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Eloquence in the Defense of Deism:
Voltaire’s Histoire de Jenni
Thomas M. Carr, Jr.
In the Histoire de Jenni (1775), his last major conte, Voltaire returns to a pattern similar in
many ways to the one he had used in his first important tale, Micromégas. In both, as
Vivienne Mylne has pointed out, two discussion scenes—the first near the beginning of
the tale and a second more substantial one—are set in a narrative frame involving a voyage.1 Critics have generally attributed this return to a structure relying heavily on debate
to convey his message to Voltaire’s increasing use of the philosophical dialogue in his later
years.2 Perhaps a more fruitful approach, however, is to emphasize Voltaire’s reliance in
Jenni on eloquence. To be sure, Freind’s debates with the Bachelor of Salamanca and the
atheist Birton have much in common with dialogues like L’ABC or Le Dîner du comte de
Boulainvilliers. But unlike these rather intimate discussions, the dialogues in Jenni are public
events in which the opponents attempt to influence a large audience. And precisely because of this a more expansive, highly charged style is appropriate. In fact, both traditional
aspects of eloquence are pressed into service—l’art de persuader and l’art de bien dire. In
addition, Jenni contains numerous minor displays of eloquence, making its use the distinctive feature of the conte’s construction. So pervasive is eloquence that characterization and,
to some extent, plot are shaped by its needs. I also hope to show that eloquence is especially
suited to the defense of Voltaire’s deistic credo.
It is not surprising that Voltaire calls upon eloquence, for his interest in it was lifelong
and particularly strong during the Ferney period. At Louis-le-Grand Voltaire, like all pupils of the Jesuits, received a thorough grounding in rhetoric. His professors during his
year of rhetoric (1709–1710), Fathers Lejay and Porée, were both authors of Latin treatises
on the subject.3 In 1755 Voltaire surveyed rhetorical theory for the Encyclopédie in the article
“Eloquence.” As his campaign against l’Infâme and for legal reform intensified, he turned
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increasingly to various forms of eloquence to stir up public opinion. Works like the Homélies prononcées à Londres attacked the Church, while a series of mémoires defended the Calas
and other victims of judicial tyranny. During the months preceding the publication of Jenni,
Voltaire frequently referred to eloquence in his letters as he prepared mémoires in behalf of
young Etallonde, who had been implicated in the La Barre affair.4
But why did Voltaire turn to eloquence in this conte? After all, its central issue, God’s
existence and His relation to men, seems to belong to philosophy rather than to rhetoric.
A look at the circumstances of Jenni’s composition and Voltaire’s views on the role of reason in eloquence provides a tentative answer. The Histoire de Jenni is considered to be in
large measure a response to Holbach’s Système de la nature (1770). Although Voltaire does
not mention the materialist philosopher by name, his reference to “un frenchman qui dit
que rien n’existe et ne peut exister, sinon la nature”5 is almost certainly to the baron. Over
and over in his correspondence and pamphlets Voltaire stated that the Système was dangerous because of its eloquence. “II y a beaucoup de choses qui peuvent séduire, il y a de
l’éloquence” (Best. D16565). He labeled Holbach “cet éloquent athée” (Best. D16388). The
only consolation he could find was that, except for a few such brilliant chapters, “tout le
reste est déclamation et répétition” (Best. D16786).
Voltaire saw reason as the basis of eloquence. In his Encyclopédie article he wrote that
“la dialectique est le fondement de l’art de persuader, et qu’être éloquent c’est savoir prouver” (XVIIL.5l5). Likewise, he referred to “des idées vraies et profondes” as “la source cachée de l’éloquence” (Best. D15418). Yet many of his references to eloquence show that he
saw it chiefly as an aid to reason, a supplement which could increase the force of reason.
Writing to Richelieu about one of the duke’s lawsuits, he said, “Heureusement les preuves
sont si fortes qu’elles n’ont besoin d’aucune éloquence” (Best. D19342). He pictured eloquence as the passport of reason (Best. D16390). In the Philosophe ignorant he notes that a
philosopher relying on reason alone will have less influence than an eloquent man: “aucun
philosophe n’a influé seulement sur les moeurs de la rue où il demeurait. Pourquoi? parce
que les hommes se conduisent par la coutume et non par la métaphysique. Un seul homme
éloquent, habile, et accrédité, pourra beaucoup sur les hommes; cent philosophes n’y pourront rien s’ils ne sont que philosophes” (XXVI.69). Part of the power of eloquence stems
perhaps from the fact that it appeals to the whole man, rather than to just the intellectual
faculties. Voltaire recognized that its goal is broader than that of philosophy; “plaire, convaincre et toucher à la fois” (XVIII.515) is eloquence’s aim. It is thus particularly appropriate in Jenni where it is a question not just of winning Jenni’s adhesion to the proposition
that God exists, but of bringing him to reform his entire way of life.
Voltaire had perhaps another motive for invoking the aid of eloquence. He was aware
that reason could not provide absolutely conclusive demonstrations for key points of his
credo. His standard was admittedly high: the certainty of geometric proof. He described
geometric demonstrations as having a sort of overwhelming immediacy: “une persuasion
pleine, une conviction lumineuse, dans laquelle l’esprit se repose sans aucun doute”
(XXVI.327). Voltaire admitted that in law (XVIII.118–19), medicine (XXIX.330), and even
metaphysics (XVIII.377) men have to deal in probabilities, rather than absolute certainties.
For example, to prove that God rewards or punishes men after death it is necessary to
establish the immortality of the soul. Yet Voltaire remained skeptical on this point all his
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life. He consistently maintained that God exists, yet many texts indicate that His existence
could not be proved with the compelling force of a mathematical demonstration. As early
as the Traité de métaphysique in the 1730’s Voltaire described the proposition there is a God
only as “la chose la plus vraisemblable que les hommes puissent penser” (XXII.202). He
expressed the idea several time that God’s existence belongs to the realm of probability,
although he did see the degree of probability as so high as to almost constitute a certainty—
it is “une probabilité qui approche de la plus grande certitude” (XVIII.358; cf. XXIX.330).6
Because of this awareness of the limits of reason, the particular brand of eloquence Freind
envisages is quite an asset. He does not wish to bypass the intellect completely: “Le grand
secret est de démontrer avec éloquence” (XXI.550). But he thinks it more important to aim
for the heart. This ideal comes across clearly in his rejection of Clarke’s proofs for God’s
existence: “ils sont plus faits pour vous éclairer que pour vous toucher: je ne veux vous
apporter que des raisons qui peut-être parleront à votre coeur” (XXI.552).
Before examining how this eloquence bolsters Friend’s defense of deism, it will be helpful to consider how plot and character add to the effectiveness of the speeches and debates.
Unlike Voltaire’s sermons and homelies, where the characterization of the orator and his
audience is minimal, in Jenni the rhetorical situation of each speech is fully developed. The
use of eloquence within a narrative structure makes the speeches more dramatic and allows character to play an important role as an agent of persuasion.
The plot’s travel frame is loose enough for Voltaire to treat us to a wide variety of oratorical displays. Besides the two major debates, there is the sermon by the Inquisitor,
Freind’s parliamentary defense of Peterborough, a rather ingenuous welcoming speech by
an Indian chief, as well as a minor debate on cannibalism between Birton and Freind. At
the same time, the action illustrates the conte’s thesis. In the first section Jenni is rescued
from physical danger caused by fanaticism and superstition represented by the Inquisition.
In the middle part it is moral ruin which threatens him as he falls under the influence of
the atheist Birton and Clive-Hart. He is finally saved by eloquence when he responds to
his father’s refutation of atheism and appeals to return to a life of honnêteté.
The characters’ use of eloquence, or their receptivity to it, is a telling sign about their
personality, just as their personality itself has persuasive force. Voltaire designed his characters so that what rhetoricians call the ethical proof—the credibility established by the
speaker’s character—works strongly in Freind’s favor, while a negative ethos undermines
his opponents.
Thus, the rhetoric of the two representatives of the Church is as damaging to their cause
as their obvious greed and ignorance. Perhaps the lies and non sequiturs which fill the Inquisitor’s sermon went unchallenged as long as his audience was composed of docile, terror-ridden Spaniards, but Freind quickly points out that “on ne raisonne point ainsi dans
la Société royale de Londres” (XXI.527). The Bachelor’s debating technique is likewise as
revealing as the arguments he uses. The discussion rambles from topic to topic with little
progression because the Bachelor is unwilling to pursue any question at length. His repeated mais, which introduce each of his comments and give the dialogue its name, are
indicative of his bad faith, of his refusal to seek areas of agreement with Freind. Unable to
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think for himself, he objects mechanically to whatever Freind says. He has confidence neither in human reason nor in the Bible and must fall back on authority—the infallibility of
the Pope as declared by the University of Salamanca.
Birton’s rhetoric cannot be dismissed so easily. The narrator takes pains to point out that
he is “plus savant, plus éloquent qu’aucun jeune homme de son âge, mais ne s’étant jamais
donné la peine de rien approfondir” (XXI.551). This facile eloquence reflects his debonair
attitude toward life and a certain superficiality in his treatment of philosophical questions.
He has the kind of mind “qui tient les vraisemblances pour des démonstrations” (XXI.551).
Still he argues in good faith with Freind, finding one after another point of agreement, until
he is ultimately converted. He is neither wicked nor stupid, only “évaporé” (XXI.576).
Voltaire goes out of his way to establish Freind as the ideal orator during his appearance
before Parliament. The fact that the whole episode is so tenuously linked to the plot and
that the summary of the speech stresses Freind’s delivery more than his arguments in defense of Peterborough shows that Voltaire’s chief interest is in presenting a model of eloquence:
II alla done en parlement: je l’y entendis prononcer un discours ferme et serré,
sans aucun lieu commun, sans épithète, sans ce que nous appélons des phrases;
il n’invoquait point un témoignage, une loi; il les attestait, il les citait, il les réclamait; il ne disait point qu’on avait surpris la religion de la cour en accusant milord
Peterborough d’avoir hasardé les troupes de la reine Anne, parce que ce n’était
pas une affaire de religion; ii ne prodiguait pas à une conjecture le nom de démonstration; il ne manquait pas de respect à l’auguste assemblée du parlement
par de fades plaisanteries bourgeoises; il n’appélait pas milord Peterborough son
client, parce que le mot de client signifie un homme de la bourgeoisie protégé
par un sénateur. Freind parlait avec autant de modestie que de fermeté . . . .
(XXI.537)
The series of negations is meant as one more condemnation of an artificial style of legal
oratory Voltaire had often criticized.7 At the same time, Freind’s eloquence is indicative of
his character; he is a man of calm, controlled sensibility. “Sa raison commande à son coeur”
(XXI.539). Thus he avoids emotion-laden embellishments in favor of a simple style. He
refuses to offer hypotheses as proofs. Finally, he has a sense of decorum and the respect
for his audience that is the mark of an orator who eschews manipulative techniques for
honest persuasion.
Freind never got the opportunity to display the full range of his oratorical talents with
the Bachelor whose arguments tended to self-destruct. Against Birton, however, who twice
is on the verge of winning over the audience, a less eloquent defender of God might not
have carried the day. The discussion this time progresses in an orderly fashion as Birton
and Freind debate God’s existence, evil, and the moral consequences of belief in God. This
is roughly the same order of topics Voltaire had followed in his Homélie sur l’athéisme
(1767). In fact, taken as a whole, the debate can be seen as a sermon of sorts. Critics have
remarked that Birton’s eloquence stems from the fact that there is much of Voltaire in him,8
and his speeches serve much the same role as the objections a good orator anticipates only
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to refute. This sustained discussion and final agreement is possible because the two share
many presuppositions: both feel that overly subtle metaphysical thought is futile, that the
universe is ordered along Newtonian lines, and that evil is the principal obstacle to belief
in God. Indeed, the question of God’s goodness is “le fort de la dispute” (XXI.557). As
Birton puts it at one point, “S’il n’a pas pu empêcher le mal, il est impuissant; s’il l’a pu et
ne l’a pas voulu, il est barbare” (XXI.562).
Voltaire spoke in his Encyclopédie article of the “dialectical” basis of persuasion. The pattern of reasoning underlying Friend’s eloquence becomes evident when we consider how
he deals with this dilemma. His strategy is to treat the problem of evil only in the larger
framework of the positive links between God and men. Thus his first concern is to demonstrate what he considers the most important of these points of contact between the human
and the divine: men can know that God exists (others include conscience, and rewards and
punishments after death). Then, without denying either the reality of evil, or of God, he
dissociates the two, changing the relationship by interposing a third element between
them. As a preliminary, he asserts that the amount of physical evil in the world has been
exaggerated by writers like “St. Augustin le rhéteur . . . qui . . . prodiguait dans ses écrits
la figure de l’exagération” (XXI.560–61). The implication is that Freind will avoid such rhetorical tricks. He presents evil as merely a by-product of the general laws by which God
governs the universe. Given these laws, “il est impossible qu’il n’en résulte quelques désastres particuliers” (XXI.561). He substitutes free will for general laws in his explanation
of human evil. Men “font un détestable usage de la liberté que ce grand Etre leur a donnée
et a dû leur donner” (XXI.564). Again God is not directly responsible. Finally, much physical evil is simply the result of human evil, and he cites the many diseases caused by man’s
incontinence and immoderation. This may not be an ultimately satisfying solution to the
problem of evil, but it is marvelous rhetoric. Freind’s use of dissociation in the larger context of God’s ties with men allows him to minimize God’s responsibility while avoiding
the picture of a God entirely removed from the world. In addition, Freind’s honesty in
refusing to deny the reality of evil is a chief factor in establishing his credibility in Birton
and the reader’s eyes.
So far the discussion of Friend’s eloquence has touched on his choice of arguments and
their arrangement. A more detailed look at their development will be possible if we compare the presentation of the points of contact between God and men in Jenni and in other
works Voltaire directed against Holbach’s Système. The goal is not an exhaustive analysis
of the figures and tropes Freind uses but to show how much his eloquence adds to the
appeal of his arguments.
Freind first argues that man can discern in the order of the universe a design, and thus
know the Designer—God. Such an argument is obviously complex, involving complicated
analogies and inferences, but in the Lettres de Memmius (1771), Voltaire invests it with the
succinctness and immediacy of mathematical proof: “Tu crois que j’ai de l’intelligence,
parce que tu vois de l’ordre dans mes actions, des rapports, et une fin; il y en a mille fois
plus dans l’arrangement de ce monde: juge done que ce monde est arrangé par une intelligence suprême” (XXVIII.440). Freind tries to retain this immediacy, while avoiding the
dryness of mathematics by amplifying the visual element only hinted at (tu vois) in the
Lettres. It is all so simple, he seems to be saying, if you will only open your eyes: “Servez-
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vous de vos yeux, et vous reconnaítrez, vous adorerez un Dieu” (XXI.554). He is successful
in touching Birton and Jenni because his proofs are, in the narrator’s words, “palpables”
(XXI.556). His descriptions of the functioning of the universe and the human body have a
vividness that grips the imagination, while at the same time he implies that his interpretation of these natural processes in terms of final causes is the only one possible. For example:
“Les secours dans le corps sont si artificieusement préparés de tous côtés qu’il n’y a pas
une seule veine qui n’ait ses valvules, ses écluses, pour ouvrir au sang des passages. Depuis
la racine des cheveux jusqu’aux orteils des pieds, tout est art, tout est préparation, moyen,
et fin” (XXI.555). Once the listener acquiesces to the vision of order and design implicit in
the picture Freind paints, the conclusion that God exists seems inescapable.
Besides making Himself known to man through His works, God has provided, according to Freind, a second point of contact in the conscience. In the Lettres de Memmius Voltaire
makes the assertion in a rather straightforward way: “Le sentiment de la vertu a été mis
par la nature dans le coeur de l’homme, comme un antidote contre tous les poisons dont il
devait être dévoré. Vous savez que César eut un remords quand il fut au bord du Rubicon.
Cette voix secrète qui parle à tous les hommes lui dit qu’il était un mauvais citoyen”
(XXVIII.460). Freind’s eloquence is able to dramatize this same argument considerably because its proof is in a sense already within Birton for it is in man’s heart that God has
inscribed His law. Freind has only to prompt this interior voice to speak out: “N’est-il pas
vrai que si vous aviez tué votre père et votre mère, cette conscience vous déchirerait par
des remords aussi affreux qu’involontaires? Cette vérité n’est-elle pas sentie et avouée par
l’univers entier? Descendons maintenant a de moindres crimes. Y en a-t-il un seul qui ne
vous effraye au premier coup d’oeil, qui ne vous fasse pâlir la première fois que vous le
commettez, et qui ne laisse dans votre coeur l’aiguillon du repentir” (XXI.570)? He personalizes what he claims to be a universal phenomenon by appealing to Birton’s own experience of remorse, rather than to that of a third party. His examples (parricide) and choice of
adjectives and verbs (dechirait, effraye, palir, affreux) evoke emotional extremes. Finally, his
contention is phrased in a series of sharp questions that seem to compel assent.
Yet conscience, as Freind conceives it, turns out to be an insufficient moral regulator. It
acts more as a censor than as a guide and can be stifled by passion or habit. Hence the need
for an additional link between God and man: punishment or rewards after death. These
serve both as a deterrent to crime and as a vindication of God’s justice. Here Voltaire states
his case in Dieu V (1770), one of his immediate responses to the Système. “La philosophie,
selon vous, ne fournit aucune preuve d’un bonheur à venir. Non; mais vous n’avez aucune
démonstration du contraire. II se peut qu’il y ait en nous une monade indestructible qui
sente et qui pense. . . . La raison ne s’oppose point absolument à cette idée, quoique la
raison seule ne la prouve pas. Cette opinion n’a-t-elle pas un prodigieux avantage sur la
vôtre? La mienne est utile au genre humain, la vôtre est funeste; elle peut, quoi que vous
en disiez, encourager les Néron, les Alexandre VI, et les Cartouche; la mienne peut les
réprimer” (XVIII.377). The argument is particularly vulnerable based as it is on expediency. Even though he has no proof that the soul is immortal, he asserts that it is useful for
men to believe in rewards and punishment after death. Nonetheless, Freind develops this
same argument into a solemn finale which completes Birton and Jenni’s conversion. In
order to make them overlook his weakest point—the fact that it is at best only possible that
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the soul exists after death—Freind uses a series of forceful questions and exclamations to
stress Birton’s admission that he cannot prove the contrary. Once Birton is on the defensive, Freind redefines the meaning of atheist in terms of utility: “n’attendre de Dieu ni
châtiment ni récompense, c’est être véritablement athée. A quoi servirait l’idée d’un dieu
qui n’aurait sur vous aucun pouvoir” (XXI.573)? An atheist is not so much one who does
not believe in God, as one who has no fear of God to regulate his conduct. This skillful shift
in definition is in keeping with Freind’s emphasis on the practical consequences of belief
in God and gives him the excuse to dwell on the frightening influence of atheism on the
poor and the powerful. Amplifying the reference to Cartouche, he paints a grim picture of
the bas peuple given over to crime and drink, while he devotes a second paragraph to the
murders committed by Renaissance prelates like Alexander VI.
These horrors lead to a sober peroration where Freind first sums up his thesis in a balanced period typical of the dignified style he has used throughout: “La croyance d’un dieu
rémunérateur des bonnes actions, punisseur des méchantes, pardonneur des fautes légères, est done la croyance la plus utile au genre humain: c’est le seul frein des hommes
puissants, qui commettent insolemment les crimes publics; c’est le seul frein des hommes
qui commettent adroitement les crimes secrets” (XXI.574). Then, aware that the peroration
is the orator’s last opportunity to stir his listeners’ emotions, he evokes in somber tones
worthy of Bossuet or Massillon the possibility of death at any moment and the agony of
remorse experienced by the unrepentant on their deathbeds.
But Freind’s professed desire to provide proofs which speak to the heart has not lead to
an exclusive dependence on fear or the more sentimental emotions. He is perhaps as satisfied by the admiration he elicits for the order of the universe as by the tears of repentance
Jenni sheds. One of the conte’s most gripping moments occurs at a pause midway in the
debate when the Indian Parouba, to whom the principles of astronomy have just been explained, falls to his knees in wonder, exclaiming, “Les cieux announcent Dieu” (XXI.568).
Yet the most powerful mode of persuasion, and one which appeals to the head as well as
the heart, is Freind’s character. His virtue is cited to refute Birton’s charge that human
nature is perverse. His modest awareness of the limits of reason disposes his listeners in
his favor, and the deep conviction with which he presents his arguments communicates
an intensity that makes them even more compelling. The effectiveness of this ethical proof
is evident in Birton’s confession of faith: “je crois en Dieu et en vous” (XXI.575).
It is not surprising that Birton and Jenni, puppets of Voltaire, are won over but what of
the reader? J. H. Brumfitt and M. I. Gerard Davis remark that “as a logical demonstration,
Jenni is far from irrefutable; as a piece of propaganda, it probably only convinces the converted.”9 This is not necessarily a sign of failure, if Clifton Cherpack’s contention is correct
that Jenni is a defense of Voltaire’s deism, an effort to reassure the authorities angered by
works like the Système, rather than an attack against atheism.10 Reinforcing convictions is
as legitimate a goal of the art of persuasion as conversion. This conte is the culmination of
a number of works written by Voltaire between 1770 and 1775 in the wake of the Système.
As the comparisons have shown, Freind’s eloquence tends to strengthen the appeal of Voltaire’s arguments. L’art de bien dire in Freind’s hands is able to add to the persuasive force
of his arguments because he has chosen to emphasize ones which lend themselves to striking presentation. He has avoided the more abstract demonstrations of God’s existence,
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such as the one based on a prime mover used in Il faut prendre un parti (1772) in favor of
the proof from design which invites vivid evocations of the order of nature. Freind’s dramatic appeals to the heart are all the more effective because he sees it as the seat of moral
experience, just as his argument for rewards and punishments after death based on expediency is well served by his tableaux painting the “cercle abominable de brutalités”
(XXI.573) of an atheist society. From the point of view of pure logic Jenni may not be any
more adequate a refutation of the Système than the works which precede it. Yet if Voltaire
chooses to rest his case with Jenni, it is perhaps because he has finally stated his position
with an eloquence that more than matches that of Holbach.
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